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OPINION 
______________ 
 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 In this unusual case, Appellant Clientron Corp. is 
actually the prevailing party below and holds a judgment 
against Appellee Devon IT, Inc. worth over $7 million.  
Clientron claims, however, that it is unable to recover because 
Devon IT is insolvent.  Before the District Court and now also 
on appeal, Clientron has argued that Devon IT’s corporate veil 
should be pierced, and that the two shareholders who own 
Devon IT as tenants by the entirety, Appellees John Bennett 
and Nance DiRocco, should be held personally liable for the 
entire judgment.  Although the District Court declined to 
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disregard Devon IT’s corporate form on the merits, it held 
Bennett—but not DiRocco—personally liable for a portion of 
the judgment as a sanction for egregious discovery misconduct.  
According to Clientron, this decision to sanction only Bennett 
was insufficient because he, like Devon IT, is judgment-proof.  
Clientron contends that it can recover only if DiRocco is held 
personally liable for the judgment as well.   
 As we will explain below, we hold that, irrespective of 
whether the imposed sanction was sufficient to cure the 
prejudice suffered by Clientron, the District Court committed 
legal error in piercing Devon IT’s veil as a sanction to reach 
Bennett but not DiRocco, and in holding Bennett personally 
liable for only part of the judgment.  We will therefore vacate 
the District Court’s order sanctioning Bennett and remand so 
that the District Court may impose a new sanction.  
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Parties’ Contractual Relationship and This 
Litigation 
 Clientron is a Taiwanese manufacturer and distributor 
of computer components.  Devon IT is a Pennsylvania 
corporation that sells computer hardware and software and 
whose sole shareholders are John Bennett and Nance DiRocco, 
a married couple that jointly owns one hundred percent of 
Devon IT’s shares as tenants by the entirety.  Devon IT is one 
of at least twenty-four business entities that Bennett and 
DiRocco have owned together using the tenancy by the entirety 
ownership form.  Many of these entities bear similar names that 
somehow incorporate the word “Devon.”  Devon IT was 
incorporated in 1999 as an S corporation.  At first, its primary 
function was to provide IT services to other Devon entities, but 
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by 2005, it had begun to transition from performing internal 
work to providing services for other companies.   
 
 In 2010, Devon IT was awarded a contract from Dell to 
sell “thin client” computer products.1  Devon IT in turn 
contracted with Clientron to manufacture the computers that 
Dell was to purchase.  Under the arrangement, Clientron 
manufactured the goods and shipped them directly to Dell, and 
Dell paid Devon IT, who in turn paid Clientron.  But Devon IT 
stopped paying Clientron entirely in March 2012.  At the time, 
Devon IT owed Clientron over $6 million in unpaid invoices 
for products Clientron had provided.  Sometime thereafter, 
Dell terminated its relationship with Devon IT and paid Devon 
IT $2 million, none of which ever made its way to Clientron.   
 
 Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, Clientron submitted 
a request for arbitration to the Chinese Arbitration Association 
in Taiwan in September 2012, claiming that Devon IT had 
breached its obligations under the parties’ agreement.  The 
Taiwanese arbitrators ruled in Clientron’s favor and awarded 
over $6.5 million in damages.   
 
 Clientron then sued Devon IT, Bennett, and DiRocco in 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania seeking to enforce the 
arbitration award.  In a second suit that was later consolidated 
with the first, Clientron sought an additional $14.3 million in 
damages from the three Defendants for fraud and breach of 
                                                 
 1 “Thin clients” are lightweight computers that are 
dependent on a remote server to fulfill their computational 
roles and are typically components of broader computer 
infrastructures.   
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contract stemming from Devon IT’s refusal to pay for products 
in purchase orders that were not covered by the Taiwanese 
arbitration.  Clientron further alleged that, under Pennsylvania 
law, Devon IT was the alter ego of its two sole shareholders, 
Bennett and DiRocco, and it asked the District Court to pierce 
Devon IT’s corporate veil.2   
 
B. The Appellees’ Discovery Misconduct 
 
 During pretrial discovery, the Defendants continually 
failed to meet their obligations under the Federal Rules.  In 
response to Clientron’s requests for documents, they initially 
asserted frivolous general objections before eventually making 
either incomplete or non-responsive productions.  At one point, 
they produced ninety-three boxes of irrelevant documents 
without sorting the documents into topics or categories.  
Moreover, despite being properly served with two deposition 
notices under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6), which 
requires a corporation to designate a witness to testify on its 
behalf, Devon IT never designated such a witness at all, let 
alone regarding basic topics relevant to Clientron’s alter ego 
claims, such as the administration of Devon IT’s bank records, 
general ledger, and other corporate records.  Defendants’ 
counsel represented to the District Court that he overlooked the 
second Rule 30(b)(6) notice, but both the court and Clientron 
repeatedly reminded counsel and the Defendants themselves 
that they needed to designate a witness on the topics in the 
                                                 
 2 Devon IT asserted counterclaims against Clientron as 
well, but Devon IT did not prevail on these claims below, and 
they are not at issue in this appeal.   
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notice.  Without any adequate explanation, however, the 
Defendants never produced a knowledgeable witness.      
 
 Meanwhile, Bennett, who was the chairman and sole 
member of Devon IT’s board of directors, claimed to be 
unfamiliar with virtually all details of the case during his 
deposition.  He maintained, for example, that he was unaware 
of whether Devon IT even maintained a general ledger.  He 
further stated that he was unable to testify regarding any of 
Devon IT’s defenses or counterclaims.  Bennett also continued 
his practice of regularly deleting all of the sent and received 
emails from his personal account after he knew a dispute had 
arisen with Clientron, and even after Clientron had filed suit.   
 As a result of the Defendants’ discovery practices, 
Clientron filed four separate motions to compel, as well as 
multiple letters to the District Court detailing their discovery 
issues.  The District Court, for its part, entered four separate 
orders requiring the Defendants to provide discovery.  After 
the Defendants failed to comply with those orders and 
Clientron filed a motion for sanctions, the court concluded that 
the Defendants’ conduct was willful and in bad faith, and that 
the prejudice to Clientron was “obvious” because there was a 
“high probability that relevant information ha[d] not been 
provided.”  App. 14.  Accordingly, in an August 28, 2015 
order, the court issued a number of sanctions against Devon IT.  
First, it imposed a monetary sanction of $44,320.50 
corresponding to the extra costs incurred by Clientron.  
Second, it excluded Devon IT’s evidence supporting its 
defense that the arbitration award should not be enforced 
because the arbitration clause in the parties’ agreement did not 
cover the products that were at issue in the arbitration.  And 
third, the District Court excluded any evidence supporting 
Devon IT’s defenses to Clientron’s non-arbitrated breach of 
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contract claim that had not already been disclosed during 
pretrial proceedings.   
 
 Importantly, however, the District Court initially 
refrained from issuing any sanctions against Bennett 
individually because he had then recently filed for bankruptcy 
and was protected by an automatic stay.  The court instead 
stated that it would reserve consideration of whether piercing 
the corporate veil would be an appropriate sanction to impose 
against him.  DiRocco was not a party to Bennett’s bankruptcy 
case, but the court nonetheless declined to sanction her 
individually because it concluded that she had not personally 
participated in any of the discovery misconduct.   
 
C. The Enforcement of the Arbitration Award and the 
Jury Trial 
 On the same day that it issued discovery sanctions 
against Devon IT, the District Court granted Clientron’s 
motion for summary judgment with respect to the arbitration 
award and enforced the roughly $6.5 million award against 
Devon IT plus interest and costs, equaling a total amount of 
$6,943,817.13.  The court concluded that the award should be 
enforced as a matter of comity under governing Pennsylvania 
law.  Clientron’s non-arbitrated breach of contract and fraud 
claims then proceeded to a jury trial.  The issue of whether 
Devon IT’s corporate veil should be pierced also proceeded to 
trial, but the District Court ruled that the jury’s verdict on that 
point would be advisory only. 
 
   Despite being provided with inadequate discovery, 
Clientron was nevertheless able to present a variety of evidence 
at trial in support of its contention that veil piercing was 
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appropriate.  Its accounting expert, Kyle Midkiff, testified that, 
based on the limited discovery provided, she was able to 
discern that, from 2010 to 2013, $24 million was siphoned 
from Devon IT to other Bennett and DiRocco-owned entities.  
And Midkiff saw that one of the Devon entities receiving the 
most money from Devon IT subsequently made payments into 
Bennett’s personal account.  Midkiff also explained that Devon 
IT’s general ledger showed that Devon IT had made a $3.5 
million loan to its shareholders, Bennett and DiRocco.  The 
same loan appeared on Devon IT’s 2010 tax return as well.  
Both Bennett and DiRocco, however, denied receiving the 
loan—or any loan from Devon IT for that matter—and claimed 
there must have been a mistake in the records.   
 Moreover, Midkiff testified that, in recent years, both 
Bennett and DiRocco’s credit card purchases had exceeded the 
income reflected on their personal tax returns.  While the 
“limited financial records” Devon IT had turned over left 
Midkiff unable to conclude definitively that corporate funds 
were used to pay these personal expenses, she said that it was 
likely Bennett and DiRocco had received money from their 
corporations and commingled personal and corporate finances.  
App. 960.  
 
 Midkiff further testified that, from 2010 to 2013, there 
was a total of $79 million in deposits that went into Devon IT’s 
account, yet Devon IT was nonetheless insolvent from at least 
2009 to 2012.  Indeed, Bennett himself testified that Devon IT 
did not make any money from 2008 to 2012.  Midkiff also 
explained that Devon IT rented office space from another 
company owned by Bennett and DiRocco, but notably, no 
leases or other documents appeared to exist with respect to this 
arrangement, and rent payments fluctuated dramatically 
between 2011 and 2013.   
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 Despite pleading ignorance during discovery, Bennett 
admitted at trial that he made the decision to spend the $2 
million termination payment from Dell on Devon IT’s 
operation costs instead of paying Clientron.  Bennett similarly 
admitted that he and two other Devon IT officers made the 
decision to spend the proceeds from other settlements on 
Devon IT operation costs and other corporate debts.   
 
 Meanwhile, DiRocco testified that she had virtually no 
role in Devon IT’s operations, nor did she have any meaningful 
knowledge of its activities.  Instead, as DiRocco 
acknowledged, she gave Bennett a proxy to act on her behalf.  
He had “unfettered discretion” to spend money in the entities 
that they owned together and to sign DiRocco’s name on 
documents in connection with those entities.  App. 924.  
DiRocco testified, however, that she occasionally hosted meals 
for Bennett’s business guests when they came to her home, and 
she claimed $6,386 in meals and entertainment expenses on 
Devon IT’s 2010 tax return.   
 
 Although Bennett was chairman and sole member of 
Devon IT’s board of directors, evidence was also presented 
that Devon IT employed functional officers, including a Chief 
Operating Officer, and a Chief Technology Officer, who 
purportedly oversaw day-to-day operations and met with 
Bennett regularly.  And there was evidence that, at least at one 
time, Devon IT had somewhere between thirty and forty 
employees.   
 
 At the conclusion of trial, the District Court instructed 
the jury that it was permitted, but not required, to make an 
adverse inference against Devon IT due to its earlier discovery 
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conduct; the instruction did not reference Bennett or DiRocco 
by name.  The jury ultimately returned a verdict finding Devon 
IT liable for breach of contract, and it awarded Clientron an 
additional $737,018 in damages.  But the jury rejected 
Clientron’s fraud claim and declined to pierce Devon IT’s 
corporate veil to hold Bennet and DiRocco jointly and 
severally liable for the contract judgment.   
 
D. The District Court’s Post-Trial Rulings  
 
 In a memorandum opinion following trial, the District 
Court adopted the jury’s verdict declining to pierce Devon IT’s 
corporate veil.  Importantly, the court did not adopt an adverse 
inference.  It instead emphasized that much of Clientron’s 
evidence was “[s]peculative, [c]onclusory, or [i]ncomplete.”  
App. 55.  For instance, the court acknowledged that Devon IT 
had sent more than $24 million to other Devon-related entities 
between 2010 and 2013, but it stressed that Clientron had not 
shown how any of that money had made its way into Bennett’s 
and/or DiRocco’s personal accounts, or how the transactions 
were otherwise improper.  The court similarly emphasized that 
it was Clientron’s burden to prove that the alleged $3.5 million 
loan actually existed and was issued for some improper 
purpose.  Finding the evidence Clientron presented equally 
consistent with “sloppy record keeping,” the court concluded 
that Clientron had failed to meet that burden.  App. 56.   
 
 Regarding the rent arrangement with the other company 
owned by Bennett and DiRocco, the court conceded that the 
payment “fluctuations were admittedly suspicious given an 
apparent lack of formal leases documenting how rent was 
calculated,” but absent more concrete evidence, the court could 
not conclude that the rent payments represented a commingling 
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of funds.  App. 58.  “One possible explanation,” the court 
believed, was that Devon IT’s office space “expanded once the 
Dell contract was signed and then shrank dramatically 
following the contract’s 2012 cancellation.”  Id. 58 n.10.  With 
respect to the Dell money and other settlement proceeds that 
Bennett had diverted away from Clientron, the court 
determined that Clientron had not proven that any of the money 
“was in fact used to benefit Bennett and DiRocco personally as 
opposed to benefitting Devon IT, albeit in flagrant breach of 
Devon IT’s contractual obligations.”  App. 60.  The court 
concluded that, without more, Clientron had failed to establish 
that Devon IT was Bennett and DiRocco’s alter ego.  It 
therefore declined to disregard Devon IT’s corporate form.   
 
 However, in the same opinion, the District Court 
proceeded to pierce the veil to reach Bennett’s assets as a 
sanction for his previous discovery misconduct.  As Bennett’s 
bankruptcy stay had by then been lifted, the court purported to 
“join[] a number of other courts which have held that piercing 
the corporate veil is an appropriate sanction for discovery 
misconduct impeding a party’s ability to prove alter ego 
liability,” reasoning that “Bennett’s conduct seriously impeded 
Clientron’s ability to prove alter ego liability and warrants 
strong sanctions.”  App. 67.  “Simply put,” the court stated, 
“Clientron would likely have had a much stronger case before 
the jury if not for Bennett’s egregious misconduct.”  App. 68.  
But the court did not pierce the veil to reach DiRocco, 
reiterating its earlier conclusion that she had not personally 
participated in any of the discovery misconduct.  And the court 
made Bennett personally liable for only the $737,018 damages 
award from the jury trial and the $44,320 monetary sanction 
earlier imposed on Devon IT; without explanation, it did not 
make Bennett personally liable for the $6.9 million Taiwanese 
12 
 
arbitration award that the court had previously enforced against 
Devon IT.  Clientron then filed this appeal.   
 
II. JURISDICTION 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(a).  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
III. DISCUSSION 
 Pursuant to Pennsylvania law, property owned as 
tenants by the entirety cannot be accessed by the creditors of 
only one spouse.  See Madden v. Gosztonyi Savings & Trust 
Co., 200 A. 624, 627–28 (Pa. 1938).  Thus, under the belief 
that Devon IT is insolvent and that Bennett is similarly 
judgment-proof because of his bankruptcy, Clientron asks this 
Court to make DiRocco personally liable for the judgment so 
that it can reach the property the couple owns jointly.  Clientron 
argues that the District Court erred in declining to pierce the 
veil on the merits under Pennsylvania law, and in the 
alternative, that the District Court erred in refusing to pierce 
the veil with respect to DiRocco as a discovery sanction.  It 
further contends that the District Court should have made both 
Bennett and DiRocco personally liable for the entire judgment, 
including the $6.9 million arbitration award.   
 
A. The Merits of Clientron’s Alter Ego Claim 
 Clientron first argues that, notwithstanding the 
Appellees’ discovery misconduct, it presented sufficient 
evidence at trial to pierce the corporate veil under Pennsylvania 
law and reach the personal assets of both Bennett and DiRocco.  
Clientron therefore contends that the District Court erred in 
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adopting the jury’s advisory verdict that declined to pierce the 
veil.   
 We review for clear error the District Court’s findings 
of fact.  See McGann v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 873 F.3d 218, 223 
(3d Cir. 2017).  We exercise plenary review over the District 
Court’s ultimate legal determination of whether to pierce the 
corporate veil based on those facts.  Craig v. Lake Asbestos of 
Que., Ltd., 843 F.2d 145, 148 (3d Cir. 1988) (“[W]hen a district 
court sitting in diversity applies state legal precepts to 
determine whether to pierce the corporate veil, the legal 
conclusion that it has drawn from the facts found is subject to 
plenary review.”). 
 Piercing the corporate veil “is an equitable remedy 
whereby a court disregards ‘the existence of the corporation to 
make the corporation’s individual principals and their personal 
assets liable for the debts of the corporation.’”  In re Blatstein, 
192 F.3d 88, 100 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting In re Schuster, 132 
B.R. 604, 607 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991)).  “Pennsylvania law, 
applicable here, recognizes a strong presumption against 
piercing the corporate veil.”  Id. (citing Lumax Indus., Inc. v. 
Aultman, 669 A.2d 893, 895 (Pa. 1995)).  Applying 
Pennsylvania law, we have previously observed that  
the factors weighing in favor of piercing the veil 
include: “failure to observe corporate 
formalities, non-payment of dividends, 
insolvency of the debtor corporation at the time, 
siphoning of funds of the corporation by the 
dominant shareholder, non-functioning of other 
officers or directors, absence of corporate 
records, and the fact that the corporation is 
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merely a facade for the operations of the 
dominant stockholder or stockholders.” 
Id. (quoting Kaplan v. First Options of Chi., Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 
1521 (3d Cir. 1994)); see also Lumax, 669 A.2d at 895.  Not 
all factors need to be present; rather, the evidence must 
ultimately show that the corporation was “nothing more than a 
sham used to disguise [the shareholders’] use of its assets for 
[their] own benefit in fraud of its creditors.”  Blatstein, 192 
F.3d at 100 (quoting Kaplan, 19 F.3d at 1521).   
 Here, setting aside the Appellees’ discovery 
misconduct, we agree with the District Court that Clientron did 
not establish that Devon IT was merely a sham.  Although it is 
evident that Devon IT withheld funds from Clientron in 
obvious breach of its contractual obligations, Clientron could 
not show that such withholding benefitted Bennett’s and 
DiRocco’s individual interests as opposed to benefitting Devon 
IT.  Indeed, Clientron presented evidence regarding money 
transfers between Bennett and DiRocco-owned entities, but it 
was unable to show how those transfers benefitted Bennett and 
DiRocco personally as individuals.  Testimony at trial, 
meanwhile, indicated that Devon IT had several functional 
officers, who ran day-to-day operations of the company while 
regularly consulting with Bennett, as well as between thirty 
and forty employees.   
 Admittedly, Clientron did present evidence that gives us 
pause.  The evidence concerning the $3.5 million loan from 
Devon IT to Bennett and DiRocco, while conflicting, certainly 
raises suspicions.  As does the evidence regarding Bennett and 
DiRocco’s credit card purchases, the fluctuations in Devon 
IT’s rent payments, and the amount of money transferred from 
Devon IT to other entities owned by Bennett and DiRocco.  But 
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although this evidence certainly shows that Bennett and 
DiRocco did not strictly adhere to corporate formalities, it fails 
to prove that Devon IT was nothing more than a sham used to 
disguise Bennett and DiRocco’s use of corporate assets for 
personal use.  Cf. Trs. of Nat’l Elevator Indus. Pension, Health 
Benefit & Educ. Funds v. Lutyk, 332 F.3d 188, 196 (3d Cir. 
2003) (observing that, under federal corporate law, “lack of 
formalities in a closely-held or family corporation does not 
often have as much consequence as where other kinds of 
corporations are involved” (citation omitted)). Thus, without 
more, Clientron’s evidence is insufficient to overcome 
Pennsylvania’s strong presumption against piercing the 
corporate veil.3   
                                                 
 3 In arguing that it has met its burden, Clientron urges 
us to adopt an adverse inference to account for the Appellees’ 
discovery misconduct.  This argument, however, conflates the 
two issues on appeal.  Seeing that the District Court imposed a 
different discovery sanction, we see no basis for adopting an 
adverse inference at this juncture as an additional sanction.  As 
we will explain in detail below, we conclude that the chosen 
sanction below was legally erroneous, but the choice of 
whether to impose an adverse inference as an alternative 
sanction will be the District Court’s to make on remand.  
Accordingly, for now, we take no position on whether an 
adverse inference would impact the result of the alter ego 
inquiry on the merits.  We hold only that, without the aid of an 
adverse inference, Clientron has not established under 
Pennsylvania law that Devon IT was its shareholders’ alter 
ego. 
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B. The District Court’s Veil Piercing Discovery 
Sanction 
 Clientron next argues that even if it failed to meet its 
burden on the merits of the Pennsylvania alter ego claim, the 
District Court should have pierced the veil as to both Bennett 
and DiRocco as a discovery sanction.  It contends that both 
Bennett and DiRocco should be held personally liable because 
DiRocco’s personal conduct was sanctionable, and because 
there is no legal basis for distinguishing between shareholders 
when piercing the corporate veil.   
 We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s 
decision to impose discovery sanctions.  McLaughlin v. Phelan 
Hallinan & Schmieg, LLP, 756 F.3d 240, 248 (3d Cir. 2014).  
“While this standard of review is deferential, a district court 
abuses its discretion in imposing sanctions when it ‘base[s] its 
ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous 
assessment of the evidence.’”  Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n (Bowers II), 475 F.3d 524, 538 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx 
Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990)), as amended on reh’g (Mar. 
8, 2007).   
 Here, the District Court undoubtedly possessed the 
authority to impose some kind of sanction against Bennett 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37.4  Specifically, Rule 
                                                 
 4 Federal courts possess inherent authority to impose 
sanctions as well, and this “power . . . can be invoked even if 
procedural rules exist which sanction the same conduct.”  
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 49 (1991).  Our 
“preferred” course, however, is that when “statutory or rules-
based sanctions are entirely adequate, they should be invoked, 
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37(b)(2)(A) states, in part, that “[i]f a party . . . fails to obey an 
order to provide or permit discovery . . . , the court where the 
action is pending may issue further just orders” sanctioning the 
offending party.  The potential sanctions endorsed by the Rule 
include, among others, “directing that the matters embraced in 
the order or other designated facts be taken as established for 
purposes of the action, as the prevailing party claims; . . . 
prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing 
designated claims or defenses, or from introducing designated 
matters in evidence;” and “rendering a default judgment 
against the disobedient party.”5  Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i)–
(ii), (vi).  
                                                 
rather than the inherent power.”  In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. 
Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 278 F.3d 175, 189 (3d Cir. 
2002) (quoting Gregory P. Joseph, Sanctions: The Federal 
Law of Litigation Abuse 428 (3d ed. 1999)).  Because we find 
that Rule 37 provides an adequate basis for sanctions in this 
case, we decline to interpret the District Court’s imposed 
sanction as an exercise of its inherent powers.    
 5 Rule 37(b)(2)(A) also states that courts may sanction 
discovery misconduct by “striking pleadings in whole or in 
part; . . . staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed; 
[or] dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part.”  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(iii)–(v).  Rule 37(e) is of potential 
relevance in this case as well, though it is clear that the District 
Court did not rely on it.  That provision provides, in part, that 
courts may impose an adverse inference, dismiss the action, or 
enter a default judgment “[i]f electronically stored information 
that should have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct 
of litigation is lost because a party failed to take reasonable 
steps to preserve it, . . . it cannot be restored or replaced 
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 It is not evident that the District Court in this case 
imposed one of the listed sanctions, though.  It is apparent that 
the court ultimately held Bennett liable for the $737,018 breach 
of contract damages award from the jury trial and the $44,320 
monetary sanction previously imposed on Devon IT, but how 
it got to that outcome is less clear.   
 As we will explain below, one might initially think that 
the District Court applied Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i) to “establish[] 
for purposes of the action” that Devon IT was Bennett’s alter 
ego under Pennsylvania law.  But because such a ruling would 
have required the court to hold both Bennett and DiRocco 
personally liable for the entire judgment—something the court 
did not do—it is not a reasonable interpretation of the District 
Court’s decision.  Thus, as we will also explain below, we are 
forced to conclude that the court’s veil piercing remedy was 
grounded in federal law.  Our task here on appeal, then, is to 
determine whether Rule 37 authorizes the fashioning of such a 
remedy.  We conclude that it does not and will therefore vacate 
the District Court’s sanctioning order.   
1. Pennsylvania law and establishing alter ego 
for purposes of the action under Rule 
37(b)(2)(A)(i) 
 Of the sanctions expressly endorsed by Rule 
37(b)(2)(A), the most plausible option in this case is that the 
District Court “established for purposes of the action” under 
Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i), that Devon IT was Bennett’s alter ego 
                                                 
through additional discovery,” and the court “find[s] that the 
party acted with the intent to deprive another party of the 
information’s use in the litigation.”   
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under Pennsylvania law.  But such an interpretation seems a 
stretch; there is little indication that the District Court had Rule 
37(b)(2)(A)(i) in mind when imposing its sanction.  For one, in 
its opinion, the court never used the language of Rule 
37(b)(2)(A)(i) or even cited Rule 37 at all.  Instead, it said that 
it was “piercing the corporate veil” as a sanction “for discovery 
misconduct impeding a party’s ability to prove alter ego 
liability.”  App. 67.  The court had also just held—earlier in the 
exact same opinion—that Devon IT was not Bennett’s or 
DiRocco’s alter ego under Pennsylvania law.  It would be odd 
if the District Court, having just made an adjudication on the 
merits of the alter ego issue, immediately turned around and 
reversed that adjudication as a discovery sanction.    
 But more importantly, the District Court neglected to 
even consider the implications of establishing alter ego under 
Pennsylvania law for purposes of the action.  Indeed, if the 
court had examined Pennsylvania law, it would have seen that 
two different legal consequences would necessarily follow 
from establishing that Devon IT was Bennett’s alter ego.   
 First, establishing alter ego with respect to Bennett 
would have necessarily made DiRocco personally liable for the 
judgment as well, because in Pennsylvania, there is no basis 
for distinguishing between two tenants by the entirety when 
piercing the corporate veil based on an alter ego theory.  Under 
Pennsylvania law, alter ego liability does not necessarily hinge 
on an individual shareholder’s personal conduct.  Indeed, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has emphasized the “distinction 
between liability for individual participation in a wrongful act 
and an individual’s responsibility for any liability-creating act 
performed behind the veil of a sham corporation.”  Wicks v. 
Milzoco Builders, Inc., 470 A.2d 86, 89 (Pa. 1983).  “Where 
the court pierces the corporate veil, the owner is liable because 
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the corporation is not a bona fide independent entity; therefore, 
its acts are truly his.”  Id. at 89–90. 
 Distinguishing between shareholders for alter ego 
purposes is especially problematic where, as here, the 
corporation is owned jointly by two tenants by the entirety.  
Applying Pennsylvania law, we have previously stated that 
tenancies by the entirety are “based on the legal fiction that 
husband and wife are one person.”  In re Brannon, 476 F.3d 
170, 173 (3d Cir. 2007).  The ownership form’s “essential 
characteristic” is that each spouse holds “the whole or the 
entirety,” and not a “share, moiety or divisible part.”  Id. 
(quoting In re Gallagher’s Estate, 43 A.2d 132, 133 (Pa. 
1945)).  The only ways the tenancy may be severed, “other than 
by the death of one of the spouses, are ‘a joint conveyance of 
the state, divorce, or mutual agreement,’” id. (quoting 
Clingerman v. Sadowski, 519 A.2d 378, 381 (Pa. 1986)), none 
of which is at issue in this case.  And as long as the tenancy 
remains intact, “[i]t is presumed that each tenant by the entirety 
may, without specific consent, act individually on behalf of 
both.”  Id.   
 Taking all of these considerations together, a conclusion 
that a corporation was the alter ego of one shareholder tenant 
by the entirety, but not the other, is legally untenable in 
Pennsylvania.  Id.  In this case, Bennett and DiRocco did not 
hold equal fifty percent shares in Devon IT.  Instead, they 
together owned an undivided whole of the company, and they 
each possessed the right to act on their spouse’s behalf.  The 
focus of the alter ego inquiry, meanwhile, is whether Devon IT 
was a bona fide independent entity—not whether each 
shareholder was personally liable for the particular injury at 
issue.  Thus, it is irrelevant that DiRocco chose not to 
frequently participate in Devon IT’s affairs, despite her 
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unqualified right to do so at any time.  Her supposed ignorance 
about a corporation in which she held a one hundred percent 
ownership stake cannot shield her from liability once it has 
been established that the corporation was a sham.   
 Moreover, even if Pennsylvania law did require some 
degree of personal involvement, evidence was presented at trial 
regarding DiRocco’s participation in some corporate affairs.  
She admitted that she occasionally hosted meals for Bennett’s 
business guests.  Indeed, she claimed $6,386 in meal and 
entertainment expenses on a Devon IT tax return.  Her name 
was also signed (purportedly by Bennett) on Devon IT 
documents, and she admitted that she took no issue with those 
signatures.  Thus, a holding on the merits under Pennsylvania 
law that Devon IT was Bennett’s alter ego would necessarily 
mean Devon IT was also DiRocco’s alter ego, and if the 
District Court wanted to “establish” alter ego as a discovery 
sanction, it needed to hold DiRocco liable together with 
Bennett.   
 There is also a second legal consequence of establishing 
alter ego under Pennsylvania law that the District Court 
neglected to impose: Bennett and DiRocco would be 
personally liable for the entire judgment against Devon IT—
that is, not just the $737,018 in contract damages and the 
$44,320 in discovery sanctions, but also the $6.9 million 
Taiwanese arbitration award.  As we explained above, when 
alter ego is established under Pennsylvania law, the 
corporation’s acts are attributed to its shareholders, and the 
shareholders are personally liable for the damages arising out 
of those acts.  Accordingly, establishing alter ego in this case 
would mean that Devon IT’s act of breaching its agreement 
with Clientron would be attributed to Bennett and DiRocco, 
and they would be liable for all of the damages resulting from 
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the breach.  The District Court, however, held Bennett liable 
for only some of the damages.  Without explanation and 
without citing any Pennsylvania authority, the court did not 
include in the judgment against Bennett the $6.9 million 
arbitration award.  Although the $6.9 million were initially 
awarded in a Taiwanese arbitral forum, they are nonetheless 
damages from Devon IT’s breach of contract, and the District 
Court had previously decided that the award should be 
enforced.  If the District Court wanted to establish alter ego 
under Pennsylvania law, it needed to include the $6.9 million 
arbitration award in the judgment against the individual 
shareholders.6   
2. Piercing the corporate veil as a matter of 
federal law 
                                                 
 6 At first blush, one might think that the District Court 
may have alternatively invoked Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(vi) and 
rendered a default judgment against Bennett on Clientron’s 
breach of contract claim that had proceeded to trial.  But for 
similar reasons, this too is an unreasonable interpretation of the 
court’s decision.  It is true that issuing a default judgment 
would have had nearly the same effect as the veil piercing 
sanction the court ultimately imposed: holding Bennett liable 
for the $737,018 in damages from the breach of contract claim.  
Importantly, however, the District Court here also held Bennett 
personally liable for the $44,320 monetary sanction previously 
imposed on Devon IT—something a default judgment on only 
the breach of contract claim could not have accomplished.  And 
in its sanctioning decision, the District Court never once used 
the word “default.”  Thus, it is not a fair reading of the court’s 
ruling to say that it entered a default judgment against Bennett.   
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 Having taken account of Pennsylvania law and ruled out 
Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i), the District Court’s chosen sanction in this 
case begins to come into focus.  By departing from the 
mandates of governing Pennsylvania law, the District Court 
appears to have granted a remedy grounded, not in the 
operative substantive law of the case, but in newly-developed 
federal law.  And the standards governing that federal 
remedy—though not entirely clear—are evidently different 
than those governing its state counterpart on the merits.  In 
other words, the District Court used judicially-created federal 
law to essentially split the baby in a way that the substantive 
state law at issue in the suit would not have permitted.  Our 
task here, then, is to determine whether Rule 37 authorizes such 
an exercise of federal lawmaking.  We conclude that it does 
not.   
 Admittedly, the list of sanctions provided by Rule 
37(b)(2)(A) is not exhaustive, and the decision to impose 
sanctions is “generally entrusted to the discretion of the district 
court.” Bowers II, 475 F.3d at 538.  Thus, the District Court’s 
decision to depart from the list of sanctions expressly endorsed 
by the rule is not fatal.  But Rule 37(b)(2)(A) is not equivalent 
to carte blanche; it limits courts’ discretion in two ways: “First, 
any sanction must be ‘just’; second, the sanction must be 
specifically related to the particular ‘claim’ which was at issue 
in the order to provide discovery.”  Harris v. City of Phila., 47 
F.3d 1311, 1330 (3d Cir. 1995) (emphasis in original) (quoting 
Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 
707 (1982)).   
 Both of these limitations are rooted in notions of due 
process.  The first “represents the general due process 
restrictions on the court’s discretion.”  Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 
U.S. at 707.  The second requires that a “specific nexus” exist 
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between the sanction imposed and the underlying discovery 
violations.  Harris, 47 F.3d at 1330–31.  Or put differently, it 
requires that the unproduced discovery be sufficiently 
“material to the administration of due process” to support a 
presumption that the failure to produce constituted an 
admission by the offending party that its asserted claim or 
defense lacked merit.  Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 705 
(quoting Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 
351 (1909)).   
 Neither of Rule 37(b)(2)(A)’s requirements was met in 
this case.  We are unwilling to conclude that the “general due 
process restrictions” on a federal court’s discretion permits it 
to circumvent the substantive law governing a lawsuit by 
developing its own, different, federal law standards based on a 
party’s discovery misconduct.  Likewise, no specific nexus 
exists between the sanction imposed and the particular claim at 
issue when the court inserts a new, judicially-created legal 
remedy into the lawsuit as the means of imposing the sanction.  
Rule 37(b)(2)(A) certainly allows courts to adopt conclusions, 
presumptions, inferences, or evidentiary preclusion rules that 
operate within the confines of the claims and defenses the 
parties have already raised,7 but we cannot say that it 
                                                 
 7 Courts may also impose monetary sanctions under 
Rule 37, but only those that represent the “reasonable 
expenses” and costs resulting from the discovery misconduct.  
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C); Martin v. Brown, 63 F.3d 
1252, 1263–64 (3d Cir. 1995).  The Appellees urge us to view 
the sanction in this case as essentially a monetary sanction 
imposed on Bennett.  Even if we found this conception of the 
sanction persuasive, we would still hold the sanction an abuse 
of discretion because the monetary amount would be in no way 
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authorizes courts to create new federal law remedies that 
liberate the courts from those confines entirely.8 
 Again, here, having already concluded that Devon IT 
was not Bennett and DiRocco’s alter ego as a matter of 
Pennsylvania law, the District Court proceeded to pierce the 
corporate veil anyway.  And it did so in a manner that, as 
explained above, Pennsylvania law would not have allowed: it 
distinguished between two tenants by the entirety and pierced 
with respect to only part of the judgment.   
 None of the cases that the District Court cited supports 
such a broad exercise of judicial lawmaking authority.  Rather, 
where courts in the past have pierced the veil due to discovery 
misconduct, they have done so through the imposition of a 
default judgment or legal presumption, or through the 
preclusion of evidence—all of which operate within the 
                                                 
connected to the expenses and costs Clientron incurred as a 
result of the Appellees’ discovery misconduct.   
 8 Indeed, we have emphasized that federal courts’ 
“power to formulate federal common law is implicated in two 
basic types of cases: where a federal rule of decision is 
necessary to protect ‘uniquely federal interests,’ and where 
‘Congress has given the courts the power to develop 
substantive law.’”  Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n 
(Bowers I), 346 F.3d 402, 423 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Tex. 
Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 
(1981)).  In this context, we are unable to identify a uniquely 
federal interest that would justify the exercise of substantive 
common lawmaking power, nor do we see any evidence that 
Congress intended to authorize such power. 
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parameters of the claims and defenses raised by the parties.9  
See, e.g., S. New Eng. Tel. Co. v. Glob. NAPs Inc., 624 F.3d 
123, 146–49 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming district court’s sanction 
deeming that alter ego allegations had been established and 
court’s rendering of a default judgment against all defendants 
after issues of corporate liability and damages had already been 
decided); Global NAPs, Inc. v. Verizon New Eng. Inc., 603 
F.3d 71, 93–94 (1st Cir. 2010) (affirming default judgment on 
alter ego claim that was entered as discovery sanction); 
Compaq Comput. Corp. v. Ergonome Inc., 387 F.3d 403, 412–
14 (5th Cir. 2004) (affirming in part district court’s finding of 
alter ego as a discovery sanction under Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)); 
Flame S.A. v. Indus. Carriers, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 3d 752, 766–
67 (E.D. Va. 2014) (establishing for purposes of the action, 
under Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i), that two of the corporate defendants 
were alter egos of one another), aff’d sub nom. Flame S.A. v. 
Freight Bulk Pte. Ltd., 807 F.3d 572, 585 n.10 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(commenting that district court’s sanction “likely would have . 
. . been an appropriate exercise” of discretion, but ultimately 
                                                 
 9 Importantly, when a court enters a default judgment, it 
does so by adjudicating liability with respect to a particular 
claim that the plaintiff has raised and then awarding the 
damages that correspond to such an adjudication of liability.  
Here, as we have explained, the District Court’s sanction held 
Bennett liable for not only the damages corresponding to 
Clientron’s non-arbitrated breach of contract claim, but also 
the monetary sanction previously imposed on Devon IT—
something a default judgment could not have accomplished.  
We therefore need not decide whether it would have been an 
abuse of discretion if the District Court had rendered a default 
judgment here.   
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concluding that issue had not been developed sufficiently for 
review on appeal); Sentry Ins. A Mut. Co. v. Brand Mgmt., Inc., 
295 F.R.D. 1, 8 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (precluding disobedient party 
from offering evidence in opposition to plaintiff’s alter ego 
claim).   
 Those cases, as well as countless others, show that Rule 
37(b) “provides a ‘veritable arsenal of sanctions’” to deter and 
rectify discovery violations.  Companion Health Servs., Inc. v. 
Kurtz, 675 F.3d 75, 84 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting Crispin-
Taveras v. Municipality of Carolina, 647 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 
2011)).  There are, however, limits to courts’ discretion.  In this 
case, it would be understandable if the District Court’s instinct 
was to fashion a creative remedy that it thought would 
correspond to the severity of the misconduct.  But by failing to 
ground its veil piercing remedy in the substantive state law that 
governed the suit, the District Court went beyond its Rule 37 
authority and abused its discretion.  The sanction was based 
“on an erroneous view of the law.”  Bowers II, 475 F.3d at 538.  
We will accordingly vacate the court’s order holding Bennett 
liable for the $737,018 in damages from the breach of contract 
claim and the $44,320 monetary sanction.  Because the 
authority to impose sanctions for discovery violations 
committed in the district courts is generally entrusted to the 
discretion of those courts in the first instance, we will remand 
for further proceedings.   
 3. Considerations on Remand 
 On remand, it will be within the District Court’s 
discretion to impose a new discovery sanction that is consistent 
with Rule 37.  It bears emphasis that nothing in this opinion 
should be read to cast doubt on the District Court’s authority 
to levy a sanction given the gravity of the misconduct, nor 
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should the opinion be read to take issue with the severity of the 
sanction originally imposed.  It is the legal mechanism 
employed that ran afoul of Rule 37 here.   
 In light of our analysis regarding tenancies by the 
entirety, we expect that the District Court will have little 
problem imposing a proper sanction on remand that achieves 
the desired effect and addresses the prejudice suffered by 
Clientron.  Indeed, in piercing the veil against Bennett as a 
sanction, the court expressly found that “Clientron would 
likely have had a much stronger case before the jury if not for 
[his] egregious misconduct.”  App. 67–68.  Insofar as the court 
declined to extend this sanction to DiRocco on the ground that 
the record did not show she was personally involved in that 
misconduct, this, as we have explained, was error, as tenancies 
by the entirety are “based on the legal fiction that husband and 
wife are one person,” In re Brannon, 476 F.3d at 173, and so 
had Clientron prevailed on its alter ego claim, Pennsylvania 
law would have required that both Bennett and DiRocco be 
held personally liable.  Thus, DiRocco undoubtedly benefitted 
from Bennett’s discovery misconduct.  By, as the District 
Court put it, “seriously imped[ing] Clientron’s ability to prove 
alter ego liability,” App. 67, Bennett protected DiRocco.  That 
the record did not reveal DiRocco’s personal participation in 
the discovery misconduct would likely be relevant in the vast 
majority of cases, but the existence of the tenancy by the 
entirety changes the calculus here.  While we have said that 
“the extent of [a] party’s personal responsibility” is one of the 
factors to be “balanced” when imposing a discovery sanction, 
Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d 
Cir. 1984), we have never held that personal wrongdoing is an 
absolute prerequisite in all instances.  This case is unusual 
because Pennsylvania law regarding alter ego liability and 
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tenancies by the entirety make it so Bennett’s and DiRocco’s 
interests are perfectly aligned, and because Clientron has made 
plausible allegations that DiRocco’s passive role was part and 
parcel of their abuse of the corporate form.  We think, under 
these unique circumstances, the limitations on the District 
Court’s Rule 37 authority do not require that DiRocco be 
shielded entirely from the ramifications of a sanction imposed 
due to discovery misconduct committed by her co-defendant 
husband.   
 With all this said, an adverse inference and/or the 
preclusion of evidence are potential options on remand.  By 
allowing the consideration of the discovery misconduct within 
the merits analysis, such measures would ensure that the 
requisite nexus existed between the sanction imposed and the 
particular claims at issue.  Of course, we take no position on 
how such measures might impact the outcome on the merits, 
and the precise sanction imposed is ultimately up to the District 
Court in the first instance. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s July 22, 2016 order that entered judgment in favor of 
DiRocco and held Bennett liable for the $737,018 breach of 
contract damages and the $44,320.50 monetary sanction.  The 
case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.   
